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COMPARISON OF WIBRO AND TD–LTE DEPLOYMENT NETWORKS:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR STANDARDS COMPETITION 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
It has been an enigma for the communities of practice and academia in the field of standards as to 
why, when the capabilities of a technology are not much different or even superior to those of their 
competitors, only some standards lead to commercial success. Previous literature indicates that a 
standard needs organisational support and legitimacy among audiences, including distributors, 
influenced by network connectivity and configuration. Using a social-network analysis, this paper 
visualises and compares the networks of wireless broadband and time domain–long-term evolution 
deployment in the global market. The results show that the presence of a few key sponsors with 
financial resources and a large installed base is more important than the size of the network. 
Consequently, we draw some implications for sustainable deployment of future standards. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The competition between the wireless broadband (WiBro) and high-speed downlink packet 
access/long-term evolution (HSDPA/LTE)1 standards appears to be over, and it is evident that LTE 
has become a mainstream standard in the global mobile telecommunications market. Researchers are 
perplexed as to why some technology standards, despite their technological excellence or, at the very 
least, not being inferior to their competitors, fail to become a commercial success in the market. 
Previous research has shown that the market dominance of a standard needs organisational support 
and legitimacy among audiences, including distributors. These factors are substantially affected by 
the network connectivity and configuration of the related technology communities. This implies that 
examining the deployment network of WiBro and LTE can help unravel the conundrum of which 
non-technological factors critically affect this race for market domination.  
WiBro was standardised in 2004 by the Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA) 
of Korea to improve the data transmission rate of mobile devices and add mobility to broadband 
Internet access. Samsung Electronics and the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute 
(ETRI) led the way for the standardisation of WiBro with the support of the Korean government, 
which regarded it as a new economic growth engine (or at least a gap-filling technology that 
overcame the limitations of existing technologies and satisfied the users’ unfulfilled requirements) 
(Nam et al., 2008). WiBro was incorporated into IEEE 802.16e (mobile WiMax) in 2005, and it was 
approved as an International Telecommunication Union (ITU) standard in October 2007. The 
prominent features of WiBro are its exchange of the air interface of original orthogonal frequency-
division multiplexing (OFDM) for that of orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA) 
and its technological support for the handover between base stations (Steen, 2011).  
 Since its adoption as an international standard in 2007, the WiBro standard has been 
deployed globally. The WiMax Forum reported that WiBro deployments reached 146 countries as of 
2009 (Larson, 2009). Nevertheless, WiBro began losing its growth momentum in 2009 as LTE began 
attracting worldwide attention as a next-generation technological standard. For instance, the WiMax 
Forum agreed to integrate some elements of the time-division–long-term evolution (TD–LTE) 
standard into its upcoming WiMax standard; this was a tacit admission that the telecom market had 
moved on from WiMax towards LTE (Har-Even, 2012). In South Korea, a country that pioneered the 
WiBro standard, the government allowed TD–LTE to be used in the WiBro frequency spectrum in 
2013; this signalled to the market that the era of WiBro was over (BusinessKorea, 2013). 
 TD–LTE, also known as LTE–TDD, has recently gained currency and replaced the WiBro 
standard in the global mobile telecom market. The substitution was possible because WiBro and TD–
LTE are technologically similar in a number of major aspects, such as operating in licensed spectrum 
bands and possessing a high capacity, wide coverage range and strong quality of service (QoS) 
mechanism (Yi et al., 2011). WiBro and TD–LTE both adopt the time-division duplex (TDD) 
scheme, which has technological advantages over the frequency-division duplex (FDD) scheme 
when there is an asymmetry in the uplink and downlink data-transmission rates. These similarities 
enable WiBro equipment and service providers to migrate to the TD–LTE standard. TD–LTE was 
jointly developed by a global coalition of companies, including China Mobile, Datang, Huawei, 
Nokia and Ericsson. TD–LTE was accepted as one of the ITU standards in January 2012. As of April 
2015, 54 TD–LTE systems have been commercially launched in 34 countries, and 969 devices now 
support it, which is 37% of all LTE devices used in April 2015; this value was 29% in October 2014 
                                                          
1 High-speed downlink packet access (HSDPA) is an enhanced third-generation (3G), also termed as 
3.5G, wireless communications protocol in the high-speed packet access (HSPA) family. Long-term 
evolution (LTE) is a 4G standard evolved from HSPA.  
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(GSA LTE Report, 2015). Many of the Mobile WiMax service providers such as Clearwire (US), 
UQ (Japan) and P1 (Malaysia) have decided to provide the TD–LTE service in the global market.  
Against this backdrop, this paper probes the following research questions: What are the non-
technological factors that decisively influence a competition between two standards? What are the 
global deployment networks of WiBro and TD–LTE? How are they different in terms of network 
connectivity and configuration? What are the key factors that contribute to the dissimilar outcomes 
of WiBro and TD–LTE? To address these questions, this paper examines the network composition 
underpinning the deployment of the two standards. With regards to methodology, this paper relies on 
a social-network analysis to visualise the global networks of WiBro and TD–LTE and identifies the 
key players in deployment networks. Moreover, comparing the networks of the two standards, we 
find what their differences are and derive theoretical and practical implications.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW: STANDARDS, NETWORK EFFECTS AND LEGITIMACY 
 
In recent years, standards have been gaining importance, particularly with respect to a firm’s strategy 
for competing in increasingly interconnected high-technology industries. Technological 
advancement has gradually turned standalone products into complex systems in which the 
interoperability between components is crucial and the value of the network rises with the number of 
users and components. Compatibility standards define how components can be successfully 
integrated into such networks and ensure that components are interoperable with other constituents 
of a larger system of closely specified inputs and outputs (David and Steinmueller, 1994). The merits 
of compatibility (i.e. the interchangeability of complementary goods (components), ease of 
communication and cost savings) generates demand-side scale economies (Farrell and Saloner, 1986). 
The user demand function is affected by the installed base of the network, resulting in network 
effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Direct network effects arise when the utility of a user depends on 
the number of other users within the same network, whereas indirect network effects result from 
increased demand for complementary goods. Cross-network effects also work, and in turn may affect 
the price structure of a two-sided market where the demands of services for both user and supplier 
sides are coordinated (Ding, 2014).   
 In high-tech industries where networks effects prevail, the size of a technology’s installed 
base and the availability of complementary goods are critical in determining a dominant design or a 
de facto standard (Schilling, 1999). A larger installed base may lead to greater availability of 
complementary goods and may consequently have a positive effect on the value of a particular 
technology, thereby increasing future demand (Hill, 1997). This self-reinforcing mechanism is also 
explained under the rubric of increasing returns, which states that small historical events at an early 
stage may have profound impacts on later outcomes, such as locking an industry into a certain 
technological path (Arthur, 1989). The size of the installed base sends a signal not only to the 
producers of complementary goods but also to consumers regarding the value or quality of a 
technology, especially when information about its attributes is incomplete and a high degree of 
uncertainty is in turn present in the market. This causes delays in building a network on a new 
standard and also creates ‘excess inertia’ (i.e. reluctance to switch to a superior new technology and 
thereby cementing a status quo bias towards the existing technology that has a large installed base) 
(Farrell and Saloner, 1985; 1986).  
  Suarez (2004) parsed the process of a battle for dominance between standards into five 
phases (R&D build-up, technical feasibility, creating the market, decisive battle and post-dominance) 
and identified the installed base, complementary assets and network effects as key success factors in 
the stage of a decisive battle between heterogeneous standards. Similarly, Teece (1986) pointed out 
that in a paradigmatic design stage, access to complementary assets and control of distribution 
channels takes on greater prominence, while price becomes relatively less significant. Keil (2002) 
showed that the alliances designed for installed bases and network effects were partially attributed to 
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the success of the Bluetooth standard. This stream of literature indicates that firms are able to 
strategically manoeuvre installed bases and network effects via inter-organisational linkages, inter 
alia, with distributors. These inter-organisational linkages between firms sponsoring a specific 
standard constitute the network structure of a technological community.  
 In industries characterised by network effects and increasing returns, organisational support 
in technological communities, in particular, those based on sponsorship,2 critically affects the 
diffusion rate of a technology, expectation of future demand and consequently technological 
dominance in the market (Wade, 1995). In the process of gaining organisational support, legitimacy 
plays a prominent role. Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995). Legitimation is achieved through a sponsoring entity’s 
value system, and more specifically, its system goals (Parsons, 1956). Legitimacy may lead 
audiences to provide resources to candidate entities that they perceive to be desirable, proper, or 
appropriate (Parsons, 1960). By granting legitimacy to candidates, audiences (e.g. the distributors of 
technology standard-embedded goods or services) serve as autonomous gatekeepers that influence 
the dominance of a specific product in the market (Hirsch, 1972). Influenced by network effects 
(Besen and Farrell, 1994), diffusion of a standard and its legitimacy can be recursively reinforcing 
(Botzem and Dobusch, 2012): legitimacy increases the adoption rate of a standard, which in turn 
further increases the legitimacy.  
 Legitimacy can be categorised into three types: pragmatic, normative and cognitive 
(Suchman, 1995). Pragmatic legitimacy is predicated upon the self-interested calculations of 
audiences that sponsor a particular standard. Normative legitimacy, however, rests on the evaluations 
of the moral propriety of a standard (e.g. consequential, procedural and structural forms) in 
accordance with accepted rules and norms (Scott, 1977). Cognitive legitimacy involves the 
acceptance of a standard as necessary or inevitable, and it is grounded in some taken-for-granted 
cultural accounts (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). The process of a specific standard being approved 
by formal standardisation organisations (e.g. the ITU) can be considered to be normative (or socio-
political) legitimation, whereas the convergence on accepted standards or dominant designs (e.g. the 
QWERTY keyboard layout), which renders alternatives unthinkable, is cognitive legitimation 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). The multiplicity of legitimacy allows for strategic manoeuvres (i.e. the 
alignment of a pragmatic legitimacy with a normative and/or cognitive one). Standardisation 
strategies encompass the creation of coercive or mimetic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983)3 
that drive others to adopt a specific standard; consequently, this privileges sponsoring entities by 
forming coalitions with audiences, including distributors (Lawrence, 1999).  
 Strategies to obtain legitimacy and, in turn, organisational support for a particular standard 
are tightly related to the network connectivity of a technological community. Some scholars (e.g. 
Delacroix and Rao, 1994; Hannan and Carrol, 1992) have pointed out that legitimacy depends on 
organisational density (i.e. the network size of a technological community). Several features of 
network connectivity catalyse the convergence on consensus among audiences (i.e. the core element 
of legitimacy). A densely interconnected network precipitates the diffusion of information on 
                                                          
2 Sponsor entities holding a direct or indirect proprietary interest create inducements for other firms 
to adopt a particular standard (David and Greenstein, 1990).  
3 Coercive isomorphism originates from political pressure and the legitimacy problem and hinges on 
the interdependence of organisations and their vulnerability to inspection, whereas mimetic 
isomorphism stems from organisations’ standardised responses to uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983).  
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audiences’ behaviours and definitions of collective sanctions, and signals membership in a collective 
entity as well as alleviates uncertainty about legitimate institutional identities (Cattani et al., 2008). 
This may lead to cognitive legitimacy, facilitating convergence on a dominant design and compelling 
audiences to take a specific standard for granted.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
This paper uses social-network analysis as its research methodology. This analysis type is widely 
used for examining the network structure of inter-organisational linkages. It conceptualises 
individuals or firms as nodes and their relations as lines, visualises these interactions and assesses 
their effects (Scott, 2012). The idea of a social network was taken up by German social theorists, 
such as Ferdinand Tönnies and Georg Simmel in their ‘formal sociology’, ‘seen as a sociology of the 
‘forms’ of interaction that carry and contain the diverse subjectively meaningful contents that 
motivate the actions of individuals’ [Scott, (2012), p. 8]. Social-network analysis has been utilised 
not only in the field of sociology but also in other areas of study. In the field of business, for instance, 
social networking concepts such as structural holes have been used to identify factors affecting the 
profitability of firms. ‘Structural holes’, coined by Ronald Burt, exist where other nodes are 
connected only through a focal node, and firms that occupy structural holes are able to control the 
flow of information and capitalise on a larger portion of the resources, thereby leading to greater 
returns (Burt, 1995; Gulati et al., 2000).  
Network connectivity and composition have been considered to be a resource that may confer 
firms a sustainable competitive advantage (Gulati et al., 2000; Gulati, 1999), i.e. a firm’s competitive 
advantage may rest on the collaborative relationships it has with its partners, e.g. its suppliers. 
Particularly, in the face of technological change, the capabilities of co-opetitors (e.g. suppliers) 
substantially affect a firm’s performance (Afuah, 2000). In industries where network effects operate, 
e.g. in the telecommunications industry, a firm’s alliance partnerships play a critical role in winning 
a standards war (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). This means that the network composition of a focal firm 
and its partners influences the success or failure of a standard in a market. 
To assess the effect of network connectivity and composition of two standards on their 
relative success and failure, this paper probes the global networks of WiBro and TD–LTE by 
analysing telecom service providers (including Internet service providers) and telecom equipment 
vendors (excluding chip and terminal vendors). It focuses on the data of transactions among service 
providers and vendors, such as procurement contracts and memoranda of understanding (MOU) for 
collaborations. Chip and terminal vendors are excluded from the scope of this present analysis 
because they do not usually make direct transactions with service providers regarding deployment of 
the standards. 
Regarding collection of network data, the authors first examined industry reports published 
by the WiMax Forum and Global TD–LTE Initiative (i.e. global partnerships among industry 
stakeholders to promote the standards) and then identified focal firms holding a critical position in 
the global deployment of the standards (mostly equipment vendors). Anchoring onto the focal firms, 
the authors collected network data by searching the firms’ homepages, blogs tailored to WiBro and 
TD–LTE and relevant industry news and reports. For comparing the two standards, the temporal 
boundary of data was set as two years after their respective adoptions as ITU standards; for WiBro, 
this boundary was 2009, and for TD–LTE, this boundary was 2013. During these two-year periods, 
these technological standards were rapidly deployed around the world, shaping the expectation 
regarding the success and failure of a standard in the global market. Thereafter, the deployment rates 
gradually declined.  
 The dataset comprises a total of 251 telecom service providers and equipment vendors. For 
WiBro, the dataset includes 165 telecom service providers (including Internet service providers) and 
20 equipment vendors. Internet service providers are included in the WiBro dataset because it is a 
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wireless broadband Internet technology. For TD–LTE, this dataset includes 52 telecom service 
providers and 14 equipment vendors. The dataset does not necessarily represent the entire web of 
global deployment of these two standards but rather considers the network data that was collected 
primarily from focal firms’ publicly available transactions. To minimise a selection bias, the authors 
cross-checked the list of focal firms and their networks through various sources, such as industry 
reports and news articles, and confirmed that the number of the focal firms’ networks collected were 
generally correlated with the market shares of the firms. After this step, the authors visualised the 
key actors’ networks of WiBro and TD–LTE and analysed the differences in the global deployment 
of these two standards. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1. Visualisation of the Global Networks of WiBro and TD–LTE 
 
On the basis of the dataset, we created a visualisation of the global networks of WiBro (Mobile 
WiMax) and TD–LTE (LTE–TDD). Figure 1 displays the WiBro deployment network in the global 
market, whereas Figure 2 exhibits the TD–LTE deployment network. The size of a circle (i.e. node) 
indicates the number of lines adjacent to the node. Relatively large nodes are key players in the 
networks as they are more involved in the global deployment of the standards.  
 As shown in Figure 1, the WiBro network comprises 185 nodes, which include 20 telecom 
equipment vendors (clustered at the centre), 42 service providers in Europe (upper left), 51 service 
providers in Asia (upper right), 5 service providers in the Oceania region (right), 26 service providers 
in North America (lower right), 16 service providers in South America (lower left) and 25 service 
providers in Africa (purple, left). As shown in Figure 2, the TD–LTE network comprises 66 nodes, 
which include 14 telecom equipment vendors (clustered at the centre), 17 service providers in 
Europe (upper left), 23 service providers in Asia (upper right), 3 service providers in the Oceania 
region (right), 4 service providers in North America (lower right), 2 service providers in South 
America (lower left) and 3 service providers in Africa (left). 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
4.2. Centralities of the Networks 
 
Centrality shows the positions of individual nodes within the network, degree centrality measures the 
number of neighbours connected to each node, and eigenvector centrality calculates the extent to 
which each node is connected to central neighbours. Degree centrality is defined as CD(ni) = d(ni) = 
Xi+ = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑗 , where degree centrality, CD(ni), is equal to the degree of node i, d(ni), which is 
calculated as the sum of each row in the adjacency matrix representing the network (Freeman, 1979; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Eigenvector centrality is defined as C(α, β) = α(I − βR)-1R1 (i.e. Ci(α, 
β) = ∑ (𝑗 𝛼 − 𝛽𝐶j)Ri,j), where α is a normalisation constant, β reflects the extent to which you weight 
the centrality of others ego is tied to (this determines how important the centrality of neighbours is), 
R is the adjacency matrix, I is the identity matrix and 1 is a matrix of all ones (Adamic, 2013; Rodan, 
2011). In degree centrality, a node plays a critical role if it has more contacts, and in eigenvector 
centrality, a node becomes significant if it has many central contacts (de Nooy et al., 2011). 
Table 1 lists the top five central telecom equipment vendors and the top five service providers 
in the global deployment networks of WiBro and TD–LTE. For WiBro equipment vendors, Alvarion, 
Alcatel-Lucent, Samsung, Motorola and Huawei are the five most connected firms. Intriguingly, 
most of these firms featured as the top five WiBro equipment companies in the global market in 
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terms of market share in 2008 and 2009, according to the data from Infonetic Research (Kim et al., 
2011). This confirms that these five vendors are central actors for the deployment of WiBro in the 
global market. For WiBro service providers, Clearwire (US), KT (Korea), Sprint (US), UQ (Japan) 
and SK (Korea) are the five central firms. It is interesting to note that among the key players in the 
WiBro network are Korean firms (i.e. Samsung, KT, SK). This shows that Korea was not only a 
forerunner in the international standardisation of WiBro (Choung et al., 2011) but also a core player 
in getting WiBro to penetrate the global market. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
As for TD–LTE, the five central telecom equipment companies are Huawei, Nokia Siemens, 
Ericsson, ZTE and Alcatel-Lucent whereas the five central telecom operators are China Mobile 
(China), Softbank (Japan), Mobily (Saudi Arabia), Bharti AirTel (India) and STC (Saudi Arabia). 
Notably, there are three Chinese firms in the list (China Mobile, Huawei and ZTE). This 
demonstrates that China positions itself at the centre of the TD–LTE’s diffusion into the global 
market. Moreover, the central-actor list of TD–LTE includes China Mobile and Bharti AirTel, the 
world’s largest and fourth largest mobile operators, respectively, in terms of connections. As of Q1 
of 2013, China Mobile retained 726.31 million subscribers, whereas Bharti AirTel had 259.84 
million subscribers (GSMA Intelligence, 2013). This may help explain the global attention 
gravitating toward TD–LTE. 
 Weiss and Sirbu (1990) empirically demonstrated that market power (measured by market 
share) and financial resources (measured by net assets) serve as crucial factors that influence the 
choice of technologies used in standards committees. We investigated the market power and 
financial resources of the main sponsors of TD–LTE and WiBro. The market share and net asset data 
were collected from WikiInvest (www.wikiinvest.com), Google Finance (www.google.com/finance) 
and the firms’ annual reports. The ratios of WiBro’s 10 TD–LTE key sponsors’ financial resources 
(measured by net assets (NA)), buyer market power (measured by the number of mobile subscribers 
a buyer has (service providers) (BMS)) and seller market power (measured by the market share of 
the seller (vendors) (SMS)) are 1.68, 5.94 and 1.69, respectively. The value of 1.68 means that the 
financial resources of the 10 central players in TD–LTE’s deployment network are 1.68 times larger 
than those of the main sponsors of the WiBro network.4 In addition, NA, BMS and SMS were 
weighted with the degree and eigenvector centrality indices, and the weighted ratios5 (TD–LTE to 
WiBro) were derived: degree (4.43, 47.57, 2.22) and eigenvector (4.08, 26.54, 1.88). It is important 
to note that the ratios weighted with centrality indices are generally greater than the ratios without 
weight. The weighted ratio of BMS is particularly significant; the degree and eigenvector-weighted 
ratios of BMS are more than eight and four times larger than the ratios of BMS without weight. This 
shows that the main sponsors of the TD-LTE network with a high buyer power are more centrally 
located than those of the WiBro network. Figure 3 presents the overall ratios of the main sponsors’ 
NA, BMS and SMS.  
                                                          
4 The ratios should be interpreted with care since the WiBro data was collected for the year 2009 and 
the TD–LTE data was gathered for 2013. These base years are set by taking into account the two 
years following the adoption of WiBro and TD–LTE as international standards.  
5 For instance, the ratio of net assets weighted with degree centrality is derived as:  
Weighted Ratio =  
∑ (𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 × 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖
∑ (𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 × 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑗
, 
where i represents each main sponsor of TD–LTE and j that of WiBro. 
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[Figure 3 here] 
 
4.3. Key Findings 
 
4.3.1. Rapid and Wide Penetration of WiBro into the Global Market 
 
On the basis of the comparison of the WiBro and TD–LTE networks, this paper finds that 
widespread deployment of a standard at a rapid pace does not necessarily assure its success in the 
global market. The juxtaposition of the two graphic images of WiBro and TD–LTE networks 
indisputably demonstrates that the WiBro standard extensively permeated the world’s market in the 
two years following its approval as an ITU standard in 2007. This widespread diffusion is partially 
attributable to the fact that Internet service providers were involved in its deployment because WiBro 
was originally developed as a wireless Internet service. However, despite its global penetration, 
WiBro failed to sustain in the market, eventually being replaced by TD–LTE. 
 Conversely, TD–LTE has been deployed in limited regions. It is yet to fully make inroads 
into the markets of North America, South America and Africa. In North America, it is considered 
weak because of LTE–FDD, which has established its dominance in the region. In the US, for 
example, the major telecom carriers such as Verizon, AT&T and T-Mobile already provide LTE-
FDD services. In South America and Africa, their mobile telecom markets are not sufficiently mature 
for 4G technology to be commercially launched in earnest. Despite its relatively inadequate 
deployment, TD–LTE has been recognised as a potential competitor of LTE–FDD and has gained 
momentum in the global market (ABI Research, 2013).  
 
4.3.2. Leading Role of Chinese Firms in the Global Deployment of TD–LTE 
 
Comparing the centralisation indices of the two networks, we find that the TD–LTE network 
(24.038%) is more centralised than the WiBro network (19.571%). This indicates that the 
connections of the nodes in the global network of TD–LTE deployment are more concentrated on a 
smaller number of key players at the top. Those influential players are Chinese firms, especially 
China Mobile and Huawei; this demonstrates the prominent role China has played in the penetration 
of TD–LTE into the global market.  
 It is notable that China Mobile is one of the top central actors in the TD–LTE network. 
China Mobile is the world’s largest mobile telecom operator; its enormous installed base can work as 
a competitive advantage (Langlois, 1992). In fact, its massive purchasing power attracts the attention 
of equipment vendors across the globe. In June 2013, for instance, China Mobile launched a massive 
TD–LTE tender, i.e. a plan to buy 207,000 base stations, which sparked a race among equipment 
vendors around the world, including Ericsson, who wanted to reap benefits from this tender (Morris, 
2013a). This emphasised the domination of China Mobile in the global telecom market.  
 Notwithstanding South Korea’s role in spearheading WiBro’s international standardisation, 
foreign firms such as Alvarion and Alcatel-Lucent were more engaged in its global deployment than 
South Korean enterprises such as Samsung, KT and SK. More interestingly, Korean telecom 
operators KT and SK held a relatively passive role in the global diffusion of WiBro compared with 
China Mobile’s commitment towards the deployment of TD–LTE.  
The ratio of the BMS of TD–LTE’s main sponsors to the BMS of the main sponsors of 
WiBro shows the significant effect of China Mobile’s purchasing power. As we weight the ratio of 
BMS with degree centrality, the weighted ratio of TD–LTE to WiBro becomes eight times greater 
than the ratio without weight. This indicates that TD–LTE’s main sponsors with a high buyer power, 
China Mobile in particular, were more centrally concentrated in the network than the main sponsors 
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of WiBro. We find that this centralisation of buyer power proved to be a critical factor in enabling 
TD–LTE’s successful deployment around the world.  
 
4.3.3. Vigorous Participation of the World’s Top Telecom Equipment Vendors in TD–LTE 
Deployment 
 
Huawei, Nokia Siemens, Ericsson, ZTE and Alcatel-Lucent all held a central role in the TD–LTE 
network. These firms, in fact, are the world’s five largest telecom gear companies (measured by the 
revenues posted in 2011 (Lee, 2012)). They also participated in the Global TD–LTE Initiative (GTI) 
Partner Forum, which was launched in 2011 to promote the technology. This indicates that they were 
seriously committed to the deployment of TD–LTE. Their relationship with China Mobile is 
noteworthy; these firms were the main vendors that won most of China Mobile’s tenders for 
deploying TD–LTE in China. 
The active engagement of Ericsson, Nokia Siemens and ZTE in TD–LTE’s deployment is 
particularly notable because these firms did not participate in the deployment of the WiBro network. 
The sales revenue of Ericsson in 2010, for instance, was 203 billion SEK (approximately US $28.42 
billion) (Ericsson, 2012). This was approximately 380 times larger than the sales revenue of Alvarion, 
the most prominent actor in the WiBro network (Alvarion, 2012). As far as the number of employees 
is concerned, Ericsson retained 90,261 workers by the end of 2010, which was over 125 times larger 
than the number of workers retained by Alvarion (Alvarion, 2010; Ericsson, 2012). This shows that 
more influential players were positioned in the TD–LTE network.  
 Moreover, Huawei, Nokia, Ericsson, ZTE and Alcatel-Lucent are active producers of LTE–
FDD gear. Technically, TD–LTE and LTE–FDD equipment share the same hardware platform and a 
high proportion of software modules (TDIA, 2012). The compatibility of TD–LTE and LTE–FDD 
technology likely facilitated the participation of global top vendors in the deployment of TD–LTE.  
 
5. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
5.1. Discussion 
 
The comparison of the WiBro and TD–LTE networks first identifies the widespread deployment of 
WiBro in the global market, including in South America and Africa. The price competitiveness and 
fast data speed of WiBro were the likely attributing factors for its global market penetration, 
particularly in developing countries. As of 2004, the price of a WiBro base station was estimated to 
be 130 million KRW (approximately US $113,500), which was cheaper than that of a WCDMA base 
station; wideband code division multiple access (WCDMA) is a third-generation (3G) mobile 
telecom standard (Kim, 2005). The downlink peak data rate of WiBro was 46 Mbit/s, which is 
almost two times faster than that of HSPA, a WCDMA-based 3.5G technology (Johnston and 
Aghvami, 2007). In fact, some researchers (e.g. Karanasios and Allen (2010)) noted its cost-
effectiveness and discussed WiMAX as an alternative for filling the connectivity gap in developing 
countries. 
 Despite its extensive deployment, WiBro cannot effectively compete against HSDPA/LTE 
in the market, and it has now been replaced by TD–LTE. For instance, Clearwire (now Sprint 
Corporation), one of the main WiBro service providers in the US, announced its plan to shut down 
its WiBro network by the end of 2015 and to upgrade it to TD–LTE (Goldstein, 2014). Yota, the 
European partner of Samsung in the WiBro standard, also stopped providing WiBro connectivity 
(Chosunilbo, 2010). Intel, which was heavily involved in the development of the WiMax technology, 
has already migrated to LTE by acquiring Infineon Technologies (Agrawal, 2010). This substitution 
took place partially because of the technological similarity between WiBro and TD–LTE as well as 
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TD–LTE’s advantages, such as its backward compatibility with legacy systems such as 2G and 3G 
(Ergen, 2009).  
 SK, the largest Korean telecom operator and one of the key players in WiBro’s deployment, 
was rather passive in the commercialisation of the technology even though Korea was active in its 
international standardisation. SK maintained its competitive edge in the Korean market by focusing 
on the HSDPA standard, a competing technology to WiBro. This incumbent firm was concerned 
with the introduction of voice services into WiBro and its potential cannibalisation effect on the 
existing HSDPA-based services (Lee et al., 2011). In fact, the absence of a voice service was 
regarded as a critical hindrance to the revitalisation of the WiBro market (Lee et al., 2009). Experts 
also believe that a lack of engagement from incumbent firms was a critical factor contributing to the 
failure of WiBro in the Korean market (Paik et al., 2010). This case is consistent with the finding of 
Henderson (1993) that incumbent firms are more reluctant than entrants to introduce radical 
innovation because of the fear of cannibalising their existing technologies.  
Unlike in the case of WiBro, the main sponsors played a crucial role in the deployment of 
TD–LTE. By examining TD–LTE’s network, we confirm that Chinese firms, particularly China 
Mobile, acted as central players in its global deployment. China Mobile’s massive purchasing power, 
in effect, drew the world’s top telecom equipment vendors into the deployment of TD–LTE. For 
instance, China Mobile’s tender for TD–LTE equipment triggered a fierce competition between 
major European vendors such as Ericsson, Nokia and Alcatel-Lucent, who wanted to reap benefits 
from the deal (Morris, 2013a). In 2013, China Mobile chose Nokia as the largest non-Chinese TD–
LTE vendor, awarding it 11% of its first-round tender; this subsequently led to a 25% increase in 
Nokia’s revenues in China (European Communications, 2014). China Mobile also played a leading 
role in organising the Global TD–LTE Initiative (GTI) with a purpose of constructing a device 
ecosystem for TD–LTE and rallying broader support at the industry level. The GTI was launched in 
2011 by China Mobile together with other operators, including Vodafone, Bharti, Softbank and 
Clearwire; as of March 2015, GTI had 117 operator members. The GTI members have undertaken 
various activities, including conferences and workshops, aimed at exploring the key problems 
affecting the large-scale commercial application of TD–LTE. They share information and facilitate 
the development of low-cost TD–LTE terminals (TDIA, 2012). Shim and Shin (2015) argued that 
China Mobile capitalised on the GTI as a tool for interessement (Callon, 1986) for imposing and 
stabilising other actors’ identities in the TD–LTE network.  
Apart from China Mobile, other Chinese firms such as Huawei and ZTE were vigorously 
involved in the development and deployment of TD–LTE. Huawei, for example, with the aim of 
creating a TD–LTE ecosystem, established open TD–LTE interoperability testing labs in Xi’an and 
Shenzhen to accelerate cooperation on chipsets, devices and applications partners (Huawei, 2012). 
Huawei and ZTE won 50% of China Mobile’s TD–LTE tender and assumed a crucial role in the 
deployment of TD–LTE in China (Morris, 2013b). Through active collaboration among Chinese 
firms, the presence of the TD–LTE standard was expanded not only in China but across the globe, as 
elucidated in the findings of our social-network analysis.  
 
5.2. Implications for Standards Competition in terms of Network Effects and Legitimacy 
 
This paper provides theoretical and policy implications. Regarding the theoretical implications, we 
find that main sponsors’ financial resources and buyer-side market power are of salient importance. 
These factors can be critical to the successful deployment of a global standard if they are more 
concentrated in the main sponsors and thereby precipitate a standard-diffusion process. Regarding 
the installed bases and network effects, this research shows that the number of potential users more 
substantially affects the future expectations of a standard and attracts influential industry players than 
the number of sponsoring firms. Entities with large user bases are able to control the subcontracting 
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system linked to their activities, namely the bandwagon effect, and persuade other entities to join the 
coalition because of their credible commitment (Foray, 1994).  
This finding also contributes to the stream of research on legitimacy. Several organisational 
ecology scholars (Delacroix and Rao, 1994; Hannan and Carrol, 1992) have claimed that the network 
size of a community positively correlates with its legitimacy, and it subsequently influences the 
survival of a particular organisational form. We found that the characteristics (e.g. financial 
resources and market power) of sponsoring actors who are centrally positioned in the network 
topology are influential factors in the survival of a specific standard rather than the characteristics 
related to the size of the network. The mechanism underlying the legitimation of TD–LTE can be 
explained by coercive pressures from powerful organizations and the mimetic processes of following 
the most prominent entities under conditions of uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Guler et al., 
2002). This implies that the successful alignment of pragmatic legitimacy with normative and/or 
cognitive legitimacy can be affected by the network configuration of a technological community, 
particularly with respect to the centralities of focal actors sponsoring a particular standard.  
We also offer implications for governments that attempt to successfully launch a new 
technology standard in the mobile telecom market. First, a policymaker should take into 
consideration possible cannibalisation effects on telecom operators’ existing technology-based 
services when it issues a license for services based on a new standard. Second, it is advisable for a 
policy designer to create mechanisms that encourage influential firms with a high level of market 
power and financial resources to lead collaborations with other players in the development and 
deployment of a standard and, if necessary, coordinate the interests of different stakeholders. The 
Chinese government, for instance, played a multi-faceted role (e.g. project founder, risk undertaker, 
interest moderator, collaboration facilitator and process monitor) in the development and deployment 
of time division synchronous code division multiple access (TD–SCDMA), a China-driven 3G 
standard (Gao et al., 2014) and provided institutional support, including the licensing policy (Kshetri 
et al., 2011). Its support in the establishment of the TD-Industry Alliance, which included major 
industry players, later became useful in the development of the TD–LTE ecosystem and deployment 
of the TD–LTE standard (Shim and Shin, 2015). It must be noted that such attempts to successfully 
develop and deploy global standards should be congruent with international norms (Kim et al., 2014). 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION  
 
International standardisation has increasingly become a strategic tool for newly industrialised 
countries to lessen their dependence on foreign technology and cultivate their own indigenous 
capabilities. South Korea and China, for instance, have actively engaged in intense competition for 
global standards with the aim of becoming standard-setters (Lee and Oh, 2008). Capitalising on its 
enormous market size, China, in particular, has made several attempts to establish international 
standards and, through this process, has become more open to foreign firms and bound by 
international norms (Kim et al., 2014; Kwak et al., 2012). Reaping the benefits of these 
standardisation experiences, including that concerning TD–SCDMA (China-driven 3G wireless 
communications standard), many Chinese firms have played a crucial role in the standardisation of 
TD–LTE. On the basis of these cases, policy implications that try to foster the innovation capabilities 
of developing countries and facilitate their economic growth can be drawn. In this context, the 
findings of this paper are of salient significance.  
Relying on a social network analysis, this paper visualised the networks of WiBro and TD–
LTE deployment in the global market. We also conducted a comparative analysis of the two 
standards’ networks and subsequently identified the following three differences: first, the rapid and 
wide deployment of WiBro in the global market; second, the crucial role of Chinese firms in TD–
LTE’s global expansion; and third, active participation of the world’s top telecom gear vendors in the 
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deployment of TD–LTE. From the analysis of these differences, we drew some theoretical and 
practical implications. Regarding the theoretical implications, we found that the main sponsors’ 
financial resources and market power (on the buyer side, in particular) combined with the central 
network positions serve as crucial factors for the sustainable deployment of a standard. This finding 
makes theoretical contributions to the literature on organisational legitimacy because it shows that 
the central role of sponsoring actors with market power in a standards-deployment network may 
outweigh the overall network size in gaining organisational support in the community. For practical 
implications, companies, if attempting to deploy a new standard in the global telecom market, may 
take into consideration partnerships with industry players that have massive installed bases (buyer-
side market power), such as China Mobile. For policymakers, it is advisable that they consider the 
possible cannibalisation of telecom service providers’ old technology-based services when they issue 
a license for telecom services based on a new standard. Furthermore, they may want to set policies 
that offer incentives for influential firms with strong buyer-side market power and financial 
resources to play a leading role in collaboration with other players in the development and 
deployment of a standard and, if necessary, coordinate the interests of different stakeholders.  
 The findings of this paper should be interpreted with care. In this research, we mainly 
focused on factors related to the network composition of the deployment of standards, which some 
researchers (e.g. Suarez (2004)) have explained as being a crucial phase in a decisive battle between 
standards. Consequently, we did not comprehensively examine other factors (e.g. technological 
superiority and pricing strategy), which would likely have some influence on the deployment of the 
two standards. For instance, some scholars (Ahluwalia et al. (2010); Kim and Lee (2016)) listed the 
factors that constitute switching costs (e.g. reference prices, flat rate bias, status quo bias, uncertainty, 
transition costs, and sunk costs), and showed that those factors influence users’ behavioural 
intentions to adopt or resist a new technological standard. Future research could investigate the 
interaction of the network-related factors with others factors relevant to a standard competition and 
delve into how these dynamics would change over time.  
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Table 1. Degree and Eigenvector Centralities of the WiBro and TD–LTE Networks 
WiBro  TD–LTE 
Vendors/
Service 
Providers 
Degr
ee 
Norma
lised 
Degree 
Eigenv
ector 
Norma
lised 
Eigenv
ector 
Vendor/
Service 
Provider
s 
Degre
e 
Norma
lised 
Degree 
Eigenv
ector 
Norma
lised 
Eigenv
ector 
Alvarion 38 20.65 0.47 66.17 Huawei 18 27.69 0.40 55.79 
Alcatel-
Lucent 
35 19.02 0.46 64.42 
China 
Mobile 
(China) 
16 24.62 0.39 55.74 
Samsung 22 11.96 0.23 32.45 
Nokia 
Siemens 
14 21.54 0.33 46.14 
Motorola 19 10.33 0.05 7.12 Ericsson 12 18.46 0.26 36.83 
Huawei 19 10.33 0.09 12.56 ZTE 9 13.85 0.20 28.91 
Clearwire 
(US) 
6 3.26 0.08 10.63 
Alcatel-
Lucent 
7 10.77 0.18 25.56 
KT 
(Korea) 
6 3.26 0.06 8.32 
Softbank 
(Japan) 
7 10.77 0.25 34.88 
Sprint 
(US) 
5 2.72 0.08 11.29 
Mobily 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
5 7.69 0.17 24.51 
UQ 
(Japan) 
4 2.17 0.05 6.81 
Bharti 
AirTel 
(India) 
5 7.69 0.20 28.43 
SK 
(Korea) 
4 2.17 0.12 17.10 
STC 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
4 6.15 0.19 27.10 
Network Centralisation (Degree) = 19.57% Network Centralisation (Degree) = 24.04% 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Network of WiBro (Mobile WiMax) deployment in the global market (Node (N) = 185)  
Note: 20 vendors (clustered at the centre), 40 service providers in Europe (upper-left), 51 in Asia 
(upper-right), 5 in Oceania (right), 26 in North America (lower-right), 16 in South America (lower-
left) and 25 in Africa (left) 
 
Figure 2. Network of TD–LTE (LTE–TDD) deployment in the global market (N = 66) 
Note: 14 Vendors (clustered at the centre), 17 service providers in Europe (upper-left), 23 in Asia 
(upper-right), 3 in Oceania (right), 4 in North America (Lower Right), 2 in South America (lower-left) 
and 3 in Africa (left) 
 
Figure 3. Ratio of the main sponsors’ net assets, buyer market share and seller market share (TD–LTE 
to WiBro) 
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